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' Italy will be a dress rehearsal...' (Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee; 9 August 1943)
There is a widely held idea in the literature on the politico-diplomatic history of
the Second World War that the occupation of Italy and the organization of the
Italian armistice regime constituted a crucial step in the development of inter-allied
relations, so much so that it represented a model for the future - not just a presage
but a paradigm which was to be applied on a European scale.1 This idea is difficult
to evaluate, if one is to avoid a priori 'axioms'2 or the logical fallacies of the 'post
hoc ergo propter hoc' kind. None the less, while it is hard to prove that the Italian
case was really such a paradigm, it can be shown that in 1943 this was precisely
the way it was considered, not just sporadically by 'some' particularly far-sighted
Westerners3 but on a permanent basis by the whole British foreign office.
The military events that marked the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943
constituted the great turning-point in the war, politically, strategically and psycho-
logically: 'As the Allies won the strategic initiative, the problems of cooperation
among them took on new forms'.4 In his speech of 1 January 1943, Roosevelt
epitomized the significance of this new phase in inter-allied relations by proclaiming
the allies' 'supreme' duty to bring the solidarity forged on the battlefield without
delay to the building of the future peace.5
As the Foreign Office defined it at the beginning of 1943, the great task for the
new year was to create an atmosphere of political trust among the allies capable
of lasting beyond the cessation of hostilities. This is the framework within which the
'Italian problem' has to be situated. In the eyes of the F.O. the question of the
control of the occupied European territories would provide the opportunity for
tripartite political co-operation to take root. Italy, the first metropolitan enemy
territory to be occupied, was thus to constitute a trial for a much broader design,
extending far beyond the Italian peninsula.
When they disembarked on the beaches of Sicily during the night of 9-10 July
1943, the allied forces began their 're-entry into Europe' precipitating at the same
1
 See respectively W. H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia. Their cooperation and conflict,
2
 See D. Yergin, Shattered peace (Boston, 1978), chs. 1 and 11.
1941-1946 (London, 1953), p. 310, and G. Kolko, The politics of war. The World and U.S. foreign
policy, 1943-1945 (New York, 1968), p. 128.
* S. Lynd, 'How the cold war began', Commentary, xxx, 5 (Nov. i960), 384.
4
 McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 220.
5
 The public papers and addresses of F. D. Roosevelt, ed. by S. I. Rosenman (New York, 1950),
xn, 3.
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time Italy's withdrawal from the war. It was at Casablanca, at the beginning of the
year, that the British and American leaders had taken the decision to launch an
amphibious attack against Sicily (operation HUSKY) after a strategic debate too
well known to require further elucidation here. Less is known, however, about what
was said during the four months of political and administrative discussions between
London, Washington and Allied Forces Headquarters in Algiers following the
Casablanca decision. It was from Algiers that Eisenhower opened these discussions
on 8 February, asking the American joint chiefs of staff and the president for
directives concerning 'important matters of policy affecting operation HUSKY'.*
In the eyes of the allied commander-in-chief for the Mediterranean theatre the key
importance of these questions lay in the fact that HUSKY, as the first allied
operation implying the occupation of non-colonial enemy territory, was bound to
'establish precedents far-reaching in scope...'. According to Eisenhower, 'policies
now adopted will affect future operations throughout the war'. The foreign office
fully agreed: 'arrangements there [in Sicily] adopted would inevitably constitute
a precedent for the civil administration of Italy and Germany'.'
What was at stake in this long 'Sicilian' debate8 was far more than what
Macmillan considered the ' rather childish' issue of the senior partnership the British
claimed, and the Americans so vigorously opposed, in the military government of
the island.9 In reality the discussion hinged on the whole question of the direction
of'civil affairs' in the territories occupied by the two allies following joint military
operations. According to the Americans, anxious to banish any likelihood of a
'parallel chain of command',10 political questions in these territories should have
been the exclusive responsibility of the commander-in-chief for the theatre of
operations, thus falling under the sole jurisdiction of the combined chiefs of staff,
from which all instructions to the C.-in-C. were to originate. The Foreign Office,
on the other hand, aimed to ensure for His Majesty's government the possibility of
directly influencing the conduct of civil affairs on the spot, without following the
'roundabout route via the C.C.S.' - which in its view suffered the double disadvan-
tage of being a military body and of being based in Washington.11
In practice, at the end of the discussions, while the British succeeded in preserving
the possibility of discreetly short-circuiting the role of the C C S . in civil affairs
through Harold Macmillan, their resident minister at A.F.H.Q., the Americans were
able to ensure the triumph of the fundamental principle of the supreme authority
of the C.-in-C. and the C C S . over the whole range of activities of the allied military
government of Huskyland (A.M.G.O.T.).
As the F.O. had foreseen, on this crucial point the Sicilian experience was to
constitute the true precedent for the 'Italian precedent'. As soon as the Anglo-
American discussions concerning Sicily had been brought to a conclusion, they
began all over again on the issue of the armistice regime for Italy as a whole. Here
8
 Macmillan to Churchill no. 9861, 9 Feb. 1943, Public Record Office, F.O. 371, R 6050/
6050/22 (37298).
7
 F.O. to Washington, no. 3596, 29 May 1943, R 6151/6050/22 (37300).
8
 For a summary of this discussion see Bruno Arcidiacono, V Italic dans Us relations interalliies:
la repetition generate (1943-1944) (Geneva, 1981), pp. 36-124, and A. Varsori, 'Senior or equal
partner?', Rivista di studipolitici intemazionali, XLV, 2 (Apr.-June 1978).
9
 H. Macmillan, The blast of war, 1939-1945 (London, 1967), p. 454.
10
 Memorandum, Haskell for A.S.W., C.A.D. files, 7 Apr. 1943, Civil affairs: soldiers become
governors, ed. H. L. Coles and A. K. Weinberg (Washington, 1964), p. 168.
11
 F.O. to Macmillan no. 857, 1 June 1943, R 6103/6050/22 (37299).
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the Americans, having originally strongly opposed them, eventually accepted the
main lines of London's proposals - the conclusion of a bilateral armistice with the
Italians, the indirect administration of the peninsula through an indigenous
government and the creation to this end of an inter-allied control commission. However
they then succeeded in placing this latter body under the authority of Eisenhower
and the exclusive jurisdiction of the C C S . 1 2
The 'American doctrine of the supremacy of the Theatre Commander'13 had thus
prevailed throughout these purely Anglo-American discussions, first as regards Sicily
and then continental Italy. It now remains to examine the overall consequences of
this, considering the question of the control of the occupied European territories,
and occupied Italian territory in particular, within the larger framework of relations
among the three major allies.
As was suggested earlier, at the turning-point in the conflict this question began
to assume critical importance in the eyes of the Foreign Office, which saw it as a
means of laying the foundations for tripartite political co-operation capable of
outliving the military victory of the coalition. The reconciliation of military
requirements and political considerations was precisely the task facing the F.O., and
in particular the newly born Economic and Reconstruction department, which,
under the guidance of Gladwyn Jebb, was becoming ' a machine for thinking out
an entire long-term foreign policy'.14
In mid-January 1943 this department hosted an exploratory meeting intended
to 'clarify [the] ideas' of participants 'on the subject of the administration of
liberated territory as soon as hostilities cease'. Right from the beginning the key
concept which was to guide all future work was clearly formulated: in each region
liberated, regardless of the 'liberator', the three allies were to exercise joint
responsibility. ' I suggested', wrote Jebb in the minutes of the meeting, 'that there
would be advantage in attempting to get from the Soviet and American governments
the acceptance of the principle that major decisions concerned with the occupation
of territory belonging to the common enemies of this country, the U.S.A. and
U.S.S.R. [... ] should be taken by the British, American and Soviet governments
jointly'. The 'advantage' of this kind of postulate is clear: the Soviets would commit
themselves to 'consult us in regard to any enemy [...] territory which may be
captured by the Russian forces'. In exchange, 'they would secure a British and
American undertaking to consult them in respect of territory in Western Europe and
North Africa recovered from the enemy'.15
On this basis, during the coming months the Foreign Office was to build up a
general plan, the aim of which was already easily perceptible: a satisfactory
transition from wartime to peacetime co-operation to be achieved via the adoption,
in the occupied territories, of a tripartite approach which, while granting Moscow
a droit de regard in the West, would avoid the risk of a Russian monopoly in Eastern
^ Europe. As Eden wrote to ambassador Clark Kerr in February, the goal was to
™ ensure that no 'one of the Great Powers should run a policy of its own in opposition
to, or behind the back of, the others': only on this condition could one hope to see
'some real European order' emerging from the defeat of Nazi Germany.16
18
 See a more detailed analysis of these discussions in La ripitition, pp. 171-316.
13
 This expression is used by P. J. Dixon in his memorandum 'Control commission and"
arrangements in Italy', 29 Sep. 1943, R 9356/6447/22 (37309).
14
 The memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), p. 109.
" U 321/67/70 (35338).
16
 Eden to Clark Kerr no. 56, 4 Feb. 1943, ibid.
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All that remained to be done was to devise a machinery to put these hopes and
principles into operation. As Jebb noted at the beginning of March,' whatever doubt
we might have as to the likelihood of its achievement, we ought at this stage to
consider the best possible solution'.17 The best possible solution, which for Jebb
implied 'some uniform system applying to the whole of Europe'18 materialized, after
several weeks of work in the Economic and Reconstruction department and some
preliminary contacts with the Americans,1* in the form of a detailed memorandum,
which Eden submitted to the war cabinet on 25 May. Bearing a rather vague title
('Armistices and Related Problems'), this document actually outlined a system of
control over the occupied territories entirely inspired by the principle of joint
responsibility on the part of the three major allies.20 The administration of the
various armistices was to be the task of a series of inter-allied commissions, chaired
in rotation by the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. At the
same time a 'U.N. Commission for Europe', representing the supreme allied
authority on the continent, was to co-ordinate and direct the activities of the various
armistice commissions and of the commanders of the occupying forces - and in its
turn was to be directed by the three great powers, through a 'steering committee'
on which each was to enjoy a right of veto.
Despite what has been written by some historians,21 the rationale underlying this
plan seems extremely clear. Had it been rigorously applied in Europe, it would have
allowed the three allies to participate on an equal footing in the formulation of each
armistice and in the politico-military control of each occupied territory, regardless
of the nationality of the troops which had imposed the armistice and occupied the
territory in question. In substance, the memorandum of the Foreign Office was an
attempt to minimize the political importance of military presence in an area during
the crucial period following the cessation of hostilities. This is hardly surprising for
a country which relied principally on its navy and air force, and which was still
reluctant to embark on a massive invasion of the continent. In this sense one could
argue that the F.O. plan was to some extent the diplomatic corollary of the
peripheral strategy sustained by the London military authorities, which would have
left the Red Army the task of destroying the Reich on the ground. The British
approach was therefore the exact opposite of the concept put forward by Stalin to
Djilas in April 1945: 'Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social
system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach'.22
This was precisely the risk felt in London in the Spring of 1943, and expressed
17




 On 24 and 25 March, during Eden's visit to the United States: Jebb accompanied the
secretary of state and profited from the occasion to discuss the matter with Dunn, Atherton
and N. Davis.
20
 Memorandum by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, 25 May 1943, U 2556/25/70
(35318). Also see Sir L. Woodward, British foreign policy in the secondworld war (London, 1976), v,
46-9, and G. Warner, 'Italy and the powers 1943-1949', The Rebirth of Italy, ed. J. S. Woolf
(London, 1972) pp. 3off.
21
 See for example B. Kuklick:' On the basis of the available evidence it is difficult to explain
this high-level British statement..." What creates particular doubts in the author's mind is that
'it immediately invited full Russian participation in the Italian surrender, and [...]London
soon attempted to dissociate itself from it' (see 'The genesis of the E .A .C , Journal of
Contemporary History, iv, 4 (1969), 190). In the following pages I will attempt to explain this
apparent incongruity. 22 M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), p. 114.
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so aptly by John Wheeler-Bennett when he wrote that, however unpredictable the
Russians might be traditionally ('Ex Sarmatia semper aliquid novi'), at the end of the
hostilities 'the motto of Stalin may well be that of Mr. Jorrocks: "Where I dines,
I sleeps'".23 In his peroration to the F.O. memorandum Eden echoed this view
declaring to his cabinet colleagues that the plan they had in front of them was the
only way to avoid ' the creation of a situation in which Russia would organise an
independent system of her own in Eastern Europe'.24 The aim of the F.O. was to
set up a machinery capable of' harmonizing' the policies of the three allies. For Eden
'the most likely way to effect such harmony is by the constitution of some body such
as the U.N. Commission for Europe'. Short of this, ' no settlement of any kind is
possible. In that case - the memorandum prophesies - we should have very shortly,
after the conclusion of this war, to set about preparing for the next'.25
Three weeks after having examined this paper the British cabinet authorized Eden
to submit the substance of its proposals to the Soviets and the Americans. In the
first half of July ambassadors Maisky and Winant thus received from the secretary
of state a short aide-memoire with the long title:' Suggested principles which would
govern the conclusion of hostilities with the European members of the Axis'. This
document illustrated in ten points the views of the Foreign Office concerning
armistices and the administration of occupied territories.28 In London, however, it
was already clear that the implementation of this decalogue would encounter serious
obstacles.
Right from the start the F.O.'s plan had had a broad ranging aim: the
establishment of a 'uniform system applying to the whole of Europe'. Half way
through 1943 however it was clear that Italy (whose capitulation had become the
main objective of the Mediterranean campaign since the TRIDENT conference in
May) was to be a test bench for the 'Suggested principles'. It is precisely the
difficulties inherent in applying the F.O.'s general principles to the specific Italian
case that will now be examined.
Jebb perceived the nature of these difficulties in June, when he expressed his
concern about the 'tendency' of the C C S . to claim exclusive reponsibility for the
zones occupied by the armies of the two Western allies: a pretension which in his
view was not only' absurd' but ' quite impossible, supposing that we postulate a real
co-operation on the part of the Russians in the execution of the armistices...'.27
The tendency which Jebb feared would indeed have had extremely deleterious
effects on tripartite co-operation, but was not at all absurd. Rather the contrary it
was the logical consequence of a situation which the Foreign Office had failed to
take into account in its plan, and which was pointed out by Professor C. K. Webster
at the end of June. 'Generally', he wrote, 'the plan does not appear to take into
consideration the fact that we shall probably still be fighting Germany during the
first stages of the work of the Armistice Commission [for Italy]'. It would thus be
impossible for this body to be placed from the start under the supreme authority
of the 'U.N. Commission for Europe, [which] will probably not be in existence'.28
The implications and significance of this were clear: so long as the peninsula was
a base for military operations, it would be difficult for the armistice commission to
be anything other than a subordinate body to the C-in-C. But how could a Soviet
" 'On the making of peace', memorandum dated Mar. 1943. U 2652/25/70 (35319).
u
 Armistices and related problems. 2S Ibid.
** See Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter F.R.U.S.], 1943, 1, 708-10.
17
 See U 3009/25/70 (35320). *» Note dated 26 June 1943, U 2709/324/70 (35385).
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representative, in direct contact with Moscow, effectively participate in (and chair,
in rotation with his Western colleagues) an inter-allied control commission which
would have to be subordinated to the C.-in-C, whose instructions came directly
from the purely Anglo-American C C S . in Washington?
To this problem there seemed to be no solution. Given his awareness of this fact
Jebb's number two went so far as to deplore the possibility that the Italian enemy
might capitulate too soon:' The precipitation of the Italian issue is unfortunate from
the point of view of machinery...'. If this were to happen, he asked, 'is there any
alternative to putting the Armistice Commission under Eisenhower... ?'29 There was
none. At a meeting on 30 June, in Jebb's office, the officials concerned drew the
consequences. If hostilities with Italy ended in the near future and operations against
Germany continued, the " inter-allied " armistice commission was bound, in practice,
to be an Anglo-American commission. Everyone saw the drawback of this solution:
'it might become a precedent for excluding Anglo-American participation on any
Armistice Commission set up in a predominantly Russian theatre'.30 But it was
equally clear that the Americans, attached as they were to the 'doctrine of the
supremacy of the Theatre Commander', would never be willing to tolerate the
presence in Italy before the end of hostilities of an executive body, autonomous and
multipartite - that is to say a decision-making centre outside the control of the
C.-in-C. and the C C S .
This then was the heart of the problem. During the early months of 1943 the
Foreign Office had conceived of a system designed to be put into practice in Europe
following the end of hostilities and to lay the ground for joint allied co-operation during
the post-armistice period, thereby ensuring that in the East the U.S.S.R. would not 'go
their own way without regard for [Anglo-American] wishes'.31 The plan, in other
words, was based on the implicit assumption that the expressions 'armistice' and
'cessation of hostilities' amounted to the same thing. It hardly took any account
of the possibility that the capitulation of one 'European member of the Axis' might
come a long time before the end of hostilities on the continent, or that this might
not coincide with the end of the fighting in the very country which had signed the
armistice. This however was exactly what was going to happen. In September 1943
Italy withdrew from the war but the war came to Italy. After the surrender, for
almost twenty months the peninsula was to be not just a base for operations but
the theatre for a military campaign against the main enemy. The result of this gap
in time between the surrender of Italy and the cessation of hostilities on Italian
territory was that for the whole duration of the fighting the armistice regime was
primarily determined not by the political considerations of those who were thinking
about the post-war period, but rather by the military requirements of those
responsible for conducting the war.
The most important of these, in the eyes of Washington, was, as we have seen,
the indivisibility of Eisenhower's authority in his theatre. It was this preoccupation,
together with a fear of an Italian version of the Darlan affair, that induced the
American joint chiefs of staff to propose at the beginning of July a procedure to
formalize Italy's defeat involving a unilateral capitulation followed by the
elimination of any indigenous central authority and the extension of the direct
military government planned for Huskyland to the whole of the peninsula, which
!
* Note by J. G. Ward, 29 June 1943, ibid.
30
 Minutes of a meeting between Jebb, Dixon, Webster, Ward, Fitzmaurice, etc., 30 June
1943,112997/324/70(35386). 31 Armistices and related problems.
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would thus be subjected to a super-A.M.G.O.T., entirely subordinated to the
C.-in-C. and the CCS . 3 2
For the foreign office there were many disadvantages to this modus operandi; the
most important of these was certainly that it implied the complete exclusion of the
Soviets. In Jebb's opinion there would be a high price to pay for this: 'We shall
probably find ourselves completely in the cold when it comes to winding up hostilities
with Finland, Hungary and Rumania'.33. On July 23 the F.O. further developed
this argument, inviting ambassador Halifax to draw the Americans' attention to the
'Russian aspect' in the conclusion of hostilities with Italy: 'If by some chance
Germany were to collapse as a result of Russian action in the field, that government
in the light of our previous behaviour over Italy might well feel justified in deciding,
without consulting even their major allies, exacdy what to put in and what not to
put in the German terms...'.34
This sudden concern with Germany is easily explained. At this time the Russians
had practically won the great battle of Kursk and had just announced the creation
of a 'National Committee for a Free Germany' - an initiative which the F.O. saw
as the ' Soviet answer to the establishment of A.M.G.O.T.' in Sicily.35 According
to the Northern department the Russians considered Europe 'as being one and
indivisible', and were as interested in France and Italy as Britain was in Poland and
the Balkans.36 And given that the British were already in Italy, whereas the Soviets
had yet to arrive in the Balkans, it was up to the London government to make the
first move.37
In reality the key to the problem was not in the hands of the British. When the
Americans finally accepted the F.O.'s idea of administering the peninsula indirectly
and signing, to this end, a bilateral armistice with the Italians, they expurged the
draft instrument proposed by London of any reference to an allied commission
charged with supervising the execution of the terms of surrender. In the American
view, this function could only belong, as Marshall wrote to Roosevelt, to 'General
Eisenhower under the authority of the American and British Governments through
the CCS. ' . 3 8
For the British this was an unacceptable and dangerous concept. Italy was going
to be a 'dress rehearsal' for other occupations of enemy territory in the future.39
Accordingly the F.O. had attempted to adapt its original ideas to the Italian
situation in order to ensure at least a partial role for the Soviets in the armistice
regime. Undoubtedly the ' ad hoc arrangement' imagined by the Southern depart-
88
 ' Surrender terms for Italy...', memorandum CCS. 258/1, 1 July 1943, R 6347/6050/22
(37305). Also seeJ.S.M. to London no. 36, 5 July 1943, ibid.
" Note of the 6 July 1943, U 3009/25/70 (35320).
34
 F.O. to Halifax no. 4855, 23 July 1943, U 3225/324/70 (35386).
35
 Note by G.M.Wilson, 25 July 1943^4514/499/38 (36991). The next day Eden
suggested this interpretation to Winant: F.R.U.S., 1943, n, 335.
36
 Note by Wilson quoted above.
37
 As Clark Kerr put it, 'if [...] we invite them to come to Italy, we should be on good
ground to demand a counter invitation'. Kerr to the F.O. no. 684, 28 July 1943,
R 6938/242/22 (37263 A). Also see Kerr to C.F.A. Warner, letter dated 10 Aug.
1943^5158/66/38(36956).
38
 M e m o r a n d u m d a t e d 3 A u g . 1943, F.R.U.S., The conferences at Washington and Quebec,
'943, P- 538-
3>
 Post-hostilities planning sub-committee, memorandum PHP(43)2, 9 Aug. 1943, P.R.O.,
CAB 87, 83.
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merit at the beginning of July provided for the creation of a rigorously bipartite
control commission, duly subordinated to the C.-in-C. At the same time, however,
it entrusted the conduct of general political relations with the Italian government to
a group of 'political agents' (amongst which would be a Soviet representative)
independent of the commission.40
A compromise between these two antithetical positions was found by Macmillan,
who suggested to his government, on August i o, that an Anglo-American commission
chaired by Eisenhower, should be given the double-barrelled task of supervising the
execution of the armistice terms and of conducting italo-allied relations.41
In practice Macmillan's formula became the corner-stone of the Anglo-American
discussions.42 It is thus necessary to emphasize that while this was probably the only
solution acceptable in Washington and Algiers, at the same time it prevented all
effective participation by the Soviets in the Italian armistice regime. It is only 'in some
kind of consultative but not executive capacity' that the resident minister intended
to involve them in the control system, and this would be achieved through an
'advisory committee' attached to Eisenhower, where the Russians would be
represented alongside the Anglo-Americans, the Greeks, the Yugoslavs and the
French. It was pretty much this solution (less than satisfactory as far as Moscow
was concerned) which Eden would have presented to Molotov ten weeks later, at
the conference of the foreign ministers of the three great powers in October 1943.43
On all sides the Moscow conference was hailed as an 'outstanding success', an
'important contribution to the common cause'.44 As far as Italian affairs were
concerned, however, it was a triumph, if anything, of ambiguity. Could it indeed
have been anything else once, in the fourth session,45 Molotov had exhumed - and
officially accepted - the British ' Suggested principles', which Eden could not
disavow but which, in practice, had become totally inapplicable to the Italian
situation? Nearly four months after having proposed its plan for a tripartite
administration of the European armistices the Foreign Office thus obtained Soviet
agreement, but at a time when this agreement was liable to give a profound
misunderstanding concerning the very nature of the system which would emerge
from the conference.
In concrete terms, the latter gave birth to two inter-allied bodies: an 'Advisory
Council for Italy' (A.C.I.), based on Macmillan's idea, was set up in Algiers and
a 'European Advisory Commission' (E.A.C.) which the British expected to become,
40
 'Administration of Italy after Husky', memorandum by Dixon dated 5 July 1943,
R 6794/6445/22 (37307). " Memorandum ACA(43)7, 10 Aug. 1943, CAB 87, 83.
41
 It was on this basis that the control commission was finally set up, at the beginning of
November 1943: see La ripitition, pp. 279-316.
43
 In the meantime the F.O. had been clearly impressed by the 'increasing interest taken
by the Soviet government in Italian affairs', and the cabinet had declared that 'the Russians
will regard [Italy] as a test case which will determine their future attitude towards
collaboration'. But American reluctance vis-i-vis any project which might lead to the creation
of'two independent sources of authority' on the peninsula blocked the F.O.'s attempt to offer
the Soviets' a satisfactory place on the Control Commission, something better than membership
of the advisory Council on an equality with the Greek and Yugoslav governments..." See La
ripitition, pp. 413, 422-4.
44
 See respectively K e r r to the F . O . no . 1252, 5 Nov . 1943, a n d the Pravda edi tor ia l of 2 Nov.
1943, N 6575 and 6536/3666/38 (37031 and 37030).
46
 See the British and American minutes in N 6921/3666/38 (73031) and F.R.U.S., 1943,1,
604-13. 705-8.
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at some point in the future, the 'supreme U.N. authority' on the continent, as
provided for in the F.O.'s general plan. Although this was never fully explained to
the Soviets at Moscow,46 neither of these bodies could immediately give the latter
what they wanted and what the 'Suggested principles' had guaranteed them,
namely full and effective participation in the conduct of Italian affairs.
On 1 November, while celebrating in its turn the success of the meeting which
had just ended, the periodical Voina i rabochii klass insisted on the importance of the
coming weeks'. 'Everything now turns on realisation of decisions taken... ' On
leaving the conference both the Russians and the British might have believed they
had succeeded in their aims. The way in which the Moscow decisions concerning
the control of Italian territory could be put into practice was soon to dissolve any
illusions on either side.
While the Foreign Office considered the constitution of the E.A.C. and its location
in London as a great success,47 for the Soviets the key element in the machinery set
up at the conference was undoubtedly the A.C.I., which they saw as the body
responsible for' co-ordination and direction of the general policy connected with the
work of control'.48 They sent to Algiers Andrei Vyshinsky, a representative of the
highest rank.4' Even before he arrived, however, two concrete questions emerged
which directly concerned the U.S.S.R.'s position in Italy. The first of these was that
of the nature of relations between members of the A.C.I, and the Italian government.
More precisely, could the former entertain any form of relations with the latter
without passing via the control commission ? In conformity with their respective lines
up to this time, the F.O. was strongly in favour of granting the A.C.I, 'direct access'
to the Italian authorities, and the Americans were firmly opposed.50 In the end, it
was to be the American position (backed by the British war office) which prevailed.
As Murphy was to inform his colleagues on the A.C.I, in mid-December,51 the only
way in which they were to be allowed to contact the Italian government was
through the bipartite commission chaired by Eisenhower.
The second problem was that of the composition of this commission. Was it to
remain an exclusively Anglo-American body or was it to be opened to the Soviets?
At the beginning of November the latter had nominated two officers to represent
them on the commission. Was this unorthodox move to be accepted?52 Once again
the F.O. was of the opinion that, in view of the importance the Russian government
clearly attached to this question, 'it would be impossible to resist their demand
without risking a major row'. The Americans insisted on a much more rigid line:
'as no Russian troops are in Italy there is no justification for them to be represented
on Control Commission...'53 As soon as he arrived in Algiers, at the end of
4
* At times they were made to believe exactly the opposite: see for example the British
minutes of the meeting of October 22.
47
 See The Eden memoirs ( L o n d o n , 1965) , n , 4 1 4 .
48
 Pravda, 2 N o v . 1943 .
49
 At the beginning Vyshinsky's colleagues were Macmillan, Robert Murphy and Rene
Massigli. The Greeks and Yugoslavs were admitted at a later stage.
60
 See R 10750 and 11011/6447/22 (37311 and 37312). Also F.R.U.S., 1943, n, 434.
51
 During the 3rd session, 15 Dec. 1943, R 238/51/22 (43829).
58
 This appointment was the result of a deciphering error during the transmission to Moscow
of the text of the armistice agreement between the United Nations and Italy: La
rtpHition, p. 453.
63
 J.S.M. to London DON 114, 11 Dec. 1943, and letter from Sargent to Bovenschen, 2 Dec.
1943, R 13105 and 12497/6447/22 (37316 and 37314).
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November, Vyshinsky strongly reiterated his government's demand,54 but Washing-:
ton's unwillingness to accept this intrusion of the Russians (and French) postponed •
any solution of the question until the second half of January 1944. It was only at;
this point that the Americans resigned themselves to accepting a Soviet presence on
the control commission. This presence, however, was reduced to a purely consultative
role, of more symbolic than real importance.
At the beginning of 1944 Vyshinsky had thus become aware that the armistice
regime established in Italy had nothing to do with the parity-based system
announced, in mid-1943, by the F.O.'s 'Suggested principles'. The Soviets had
practically no role in the executive machinery of control; the consultative body in
which they did have a full role had proved to be disappointing, 'slow and lacking
in drive' and, worse still, lacking in 'adequate rights'.56 Their reaction to this
situation was to materialize after Vyshinsky's return to Moscow (in mid-February).
It took the form of a spectacular diplomatic manoeuvre which, by short-circuiting
the control commission, was to put at stake the very foundations of the armistice
regime.
At the beginning of March 1944 the Anglo-Americans learnt with surprise,
irritation and concern that the U.S.S.R. and Italy had decided to reestablish 'official
relations' and to exchange direct representatives. For public opinion, the most
'sensational' aspect of the operation was Moscow's' recognition of [Italy's] ex-fascist
premier'.6* Neither the F.O. nor Macmillan could mistake its 'deeper significance'.5'
Behind the U.S.S.R.'s political recognition of the king and Badoglio's government
(which Churchill, too, had greeted with unconcealed satisfaction58) the resident
minister was perfectly aware of the attack on the control system which the Western
allies had established in the south of the peninsula following the Moscow conference.
As we have seen, this system was primarily an expression of the requirements put
forward- by Washington. The Americans' protests to the Moscow government were
thus very firm, much more so than those of the F.O., which aimed not so much to
reverse the fait accompli as to limit its consequences.5* However vigorous, the
Western reactions were not enough to make the Soviets go back on their move. It
does seem legitimate to argue, on the other hand, that these protests may have
prevented the Russians from continuing the policy launched in March and adopting
the kind of active, independent line of conduct which would have represented the
logical follow-up of this diplomatic action. Vyshinsky's successor had confidentially
announced just this kind of strategy to Renato Prunas, general secretary to the
Italian foreign ministry, when he assured him that the exchange of direct representa-
tives would not remain 'an isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet
proposals based on a policy of closer relations with Italy'.60
Informed of this, just as confidentially, by Prunas, the Anglo-Americans decided
to take this opportunity to address a severe warning to the Russians (and the
64
 Naturally enough Massigli, the French delegate on the A.C.I., followed closely on his
heels.
55
 This was Vyshinsky's verdict on his return to the U.S.S.R., as expressed to the British
ambassador: Clark Kerr to the F.O. no. 691, 14 Mar. 1944, R 4019/51/22 (43830).
56
 V. Mastny, Russia's road to the cold war (New York, 1979), p. 143.
" Macmillan to the F.O. no. 408, 10 Mar. 1944, R 3880/51/22 (43830).
58
 See his minute M 255/4, 10 Mar. 1944, R 4328/51/22 (43830).
59
 Halifax to the F.O. no. 1374,18 Mar. 1944, R 4332/51/22 (43830) and Hull's instructions
to Harriman, 16 Mar. 1944, F.R.U.S., 1944, m, 1057-9.
60
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Italians): 'The Italian government is not in a position to enter into any engagement
with any country without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander which must
be sought through the Control Commission'.61 But on which article of the armistice
agreement should this warning be based, asked chief commissioner Mason-
Macfarlane? It should not be based on the armistice, Eden replied, but on the
'general right of a C.-in-C. of occupying forces on grounds of military security to
control relations between the occupied territory and all other countries'.62
Barely a year had passed since the Foreign Office had sketched out its 'uniform
European system' founding it on the postulate that the three great powers should
exercise joint responsibilities in all occupied enemy territories. Now it was the
opposite principle which was being formulated. When Eden referred to a 'general
right' of the C.-in-C. prevailing over the stipulations of the armistice convention,83
he was actually saying that the military occupier should have exclusive responsibility
for the regions controlled by his troops. The British had thus totally reversed their
position.
As far as the British were concerned, we have seen that the exclusion of the Soviet
Union derived neither from a lack of foresight, nor yet from a deliberate, politically
motivated design. The Foreign Office was not in the least blind to the 'exemplary'
importance of Italy nor was it particularly worried about the political dangers which
might originate from a Soviet presence on the peninsula.64 On the contrary, what
it did fear extremely were the consequences of an Anglo-American attitude ofchasse
gardie, and the only coherent plan it drew up for the administration of the European
armistices did not exclude the Russians from the control of the territories occupied
by the Western allies but rather involved them. But the immediate concerns of
A.F.H.Q. in Algiers and of the military authorities in Washington prevailed over
the longer term considerations of the F.O. and gradually came to deform its plan.
To conclude, if Soviet participation was not achieved in Italy this was not due to
the British policy but rather to the impossibility of applying this policy. This in its
turn was the result of the preponderant weight of military logic', in the post-armistice
period, in a territory where the armistice had marked the opening, not the end, of
hostilities.
61
 Eden to Macmillan no. 421, 23 Mar. 1944, R 4547/51/22 (43830).
" Ibid, and NAF 653, 22 Mar. 1944, R 4665/51/22 (43830).
" It should be emphasized that the preamble to this document placed the U.S.S.R. on the
same footing as Great Britain and the United States.
•* As has been argued by M. Herz: 'The U.S. and Britain did not wish the Russians to have
a role in the occupation of Italy because they were worried that the Russians would support
the activities of the Italian communists...' Beginnings of the cold war (Bloomington, 1966),
p. 182.
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